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IN THE SUPREME THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitionei, 
v. 
BRIAN E. MAGUIRE, 
De f endant-Re sponden t 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
question presented for review Is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously heiu , late v. Gibbont- , 4 0 i" 2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a "strit^ compliance" with rulf u if 
Utah Rules I ("i mui I l-'i ncedio hirli supersedes the 
"record as a whole" test traditionally appljeMi m iMn'iew • 
c> whether a guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
entered. 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on November 
16, 1990, and appears i i :t State v Mag aire •, 1 » 900045-CA (Utar 
App. Nov. 16f 199C mpublished) (a copj c f the court ,»•» op 
addendum). 
JURISDICTION UF I'HIS CUUkT 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition 
under utau .,„( Jt," A, t n ? •  ? ( < | ' «'! |S»rr. 1990). . 
Case No. 
i 
t . ' C a t e y t n } I" Il I 3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 21, 1988, defendant was charged with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-5-103 (1990); mayhem, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1990); and being a 
habitual criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1990)(R. 31). On March 4, 1988, defendant 
pleaded not guilty to all charges. On April 21, 1988, defendant 
executed an affidavit and entered a no contest plea to the charge 
of aggravated assault (R. 111-12); (transcript of plea hearing 
(hereinafter "T.") 8). The other two charges were withdrawn on 
the same date (T. 9). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the 
prosecution recommended to the trial court that defendant be 
sentenced for the offense as a class A misdemeanor (T. 11). The 
trial court accepted the prosecution's recommendation and 
sentenced defendant to one year in the Salt Lake County Jail with 
credit for 30 days served (T. 14-15). Defendant chose to serve i 
his sentence at the Utah State Prison (T. 15), and he completed 
his term on or about March 22, 1989. Defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea on August 10, 1988 (R. 124-29). On i 
November 30, 1989, a hearing was held on defendant's motion, and 
on December 1, 1989 the trial court denied the motion (R. 241-
43). The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of < 
law, and signed the order on December 15, 1989 (R. 256-60). 
Judge James S. Sawaya presided over defendant's guilty plea 
proceeding but recused himself after defendant filed his motion 
to withdraw the plea (R. 217). The case was reassigned to Judge 
Richard H. Moffat. 
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Defendant ^peal on January 10, 1990 (R. 263-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
*fendant entered a no contest plea 
in nine counj • ! aggravated assault third degre* * 
1111 \ t 111 mi * ; - -5-103(1990 Defendant • =- •1 p* 
was entered , . *, aqreemen whichf in 
exchange defendant's plea, the prosecution agree: 
disi *ayhem, econd degree felony, i iolation 
L Utah Code Ann
 ;i j-^ »lu 
criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ ommend that defendant ^ sentenced 
as though the offense were n ,.-;:--•. A misdemeaiiui 
111 2)- Tl le * ::harge had resulted from an incident in which 
defendant allegedly assau, ndmother. rippinq off part 
of her ear and inflicting injuries 
i on defendar ontest plea defendant 
signed a standard ^\\ .^^> * ~ expia r i q I i t w in 
conformity rule 11 (e ". *.- Criminal Procedure. " ^  
trans* f '-at defendant was told the 
acts he committed which gave rise y 
virtue of his prior guilty plea, he was presumed innocent 
until * sonable doubt (Id.); 
that State had the burden of proving each 
:: i :i im beyond a reasonable doubt |r" I - 4 „ ;> | , thai 
defendant - no burde i ;i I i i CHII^P m "I 1 i 1 hat 
defendant _• right i- a trial by juiy i Kl. i , that tin- court 
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treated a no contest plea the same as a guilty plea (Ld.); and 
that the court was not bound by the prosecution's recommendation 
concerning sentencing (T. 5). Defendant stated that he had read 
and understood the affidavit he was signing and the rights, 
elements of the crime and facts giving rise to the charges, as 
set forth in that affidavit (T. 6-7). Defendant also testified 
that he understood the penalties for the offense of a third 
degree felony and that he was signing the affidavit of his own 
free will without force, coercion or threat (T. 5,8). After 
signing the affidavit, defendant entered a no contest plea (Id.). 
Defendant waived the statutory time limit for 
sentencing and was sentenced, as recommended by the prosecution, 
to a term of one year with a credit of 30 days, as though he had 
pleaded no contest to a class A misdemeanor charge (T. 9, 14). 
In a discussion regarding defendant's sentencing, defendant's 
counsel, with defendant present, discussed defendant's parole 
status. She stated, in pertinent part, ,f[t]he Board of Pardons 
will have to consider some technical matters, violations as well 
as this new conviction, and they will no doubt give him some more 
time than that [referring to the class A misdemeanor sentence] 
. . . " (T. 11). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea, defendant testified that he had not read the affidavit he 
had signed at the time of his plea (transcript of hearing on 
motion to withdraw plea (hereinafter "TA.") 49) but admitted to 
having testified to the contrary at the plea hearing (TA. 51-52). 
He testified to his belief that he was entering a contract with 
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the "Executive Branch" of the Utah State government and that any 
agreement he made in his plea was binding on both the county 
attorney and Adult Probation and Parole, as agents of the 
"Executive Branch" (TA. 53-54). Defendant also asserted, without 
offering documentary or other evidence, that his parole from the 
Utah State Prison was revoked solely as a result of the 
conviction arising from his no contest plea (TA. 54). He stated 
that he was coerced into entering the plea (TA. 57). Defendant 
did not testify to and no other evidence was offered asserting 
any deficiencies in the taking of the no contest plea. 
In denying defendant's motion, the trial court 
concluded, inter alia, that defendant's plea was entered 
knowingly and voluntarily and that the State of Utah had kept 
good faith with defendant and delivered each of its promises made 
to defendant up through sentencing (R. 258). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT 
STATE V. GIBBONS, 740 P.2D 1309 (UTAH 1987)
 f 
ADOPTED A TEST OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 
11(5), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
WHICH SUPERSEDES THE "RECORD AS A WHOLE" TEST 
TRADITIONALLY APPLIED ON REVIEW TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER A GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
On appeal defendant asserted several bases for 
reversing the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his 
no contest plea. First, in response to the court of appeals' 
holding in State v. Vasilacopulosf 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), defendant stated that 
the trial court improperly applied the "record as a whole" 
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analysis in determining the validity of his plea. The State 
responded that, under the "record as a whole" test traditionally 
applied by this Court on post-conviction review of the validity 
of a guilty plea, the record clearly supported the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion. See, e.g., Jolivet v. Cook, 784 
P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990); State 
v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 
403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).3 
In reversing and remanding to allow defendant to withdraw 
his guilty plea, the court of appeals rejected the State's 
argument, continuing to conclude that this Court in State v. 
Gibbons replaced the "record as a whole" test with a strict rule 
11 compliance test. Maguiref Case No. 900045-CA at 3. The court 
of appeals decision misconstrues Gibbons and ignores significant 
language in both pre-Gibbons and post-Gibbons opinions of this 
Court. 
In Gibbons, this Court did not review either the trial i 
court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or the 
voluntariness of the defendant's guilty pleas. Rather, the 
Court, in the context of remanding the case because an attack on ( 
o 
Because the court of appeals reversed on the basis of lack of 
on-the record strict compliance with rule 11, it did not reach 
the merits of defendant's other arguments. 
3 i 
The "record as a whole" test was stated in Miller as follows: 
[T]he absence of a finding under [rule 11] is 
not critical so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving. 
718 P.2d at 405. 
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the voluntariness of a guilty plea must first be presented to the 
trial court in the form of a motion to withdraw, concluded that 
Ma statement of the law concerning the taking of guilty pleas in 
all trial courts in this state is appropriate." Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312. It then set out the specific requirements for 
taking of guilty pleas under rule 11 for the purpose of assisting 
the trial court on remand in determining the validity of the 
defendant's pleas. Ibid. The Gibbons Court did not even mention 
the record as a whole test for determining voluntariness of a 
guilty plea, and the reason seems obvious: the Court was not 
reviewing the trial court record to determine the voluntariness 
of the defendant's pleas. Thus, the court of appeals' conclusion 
that Gibbons replaced the record as a whole test with a strict 
compliance test reads far too much into Gibbons. The Gibbons 
Court simply did not address that issue. 
Furthermore, certain language in several post-Gibbons 
opinions of this Court strongly suggests that the record as a 
whole test was not modified by Gibbons. For example, in Jolivet 
v. Cook, this Court stated: 
We first address Jolivet's claim that his 
guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. 
Specifically, Jolivet argues that Judge Burns 
erred in the taking of his guilty pleas 
because he did not make findings that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how those elements related to the facts, 
as required by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), or that Jolivet knew the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. In fact, Jolivet claims that he 
did not know or understand these things when 
he entered his pleas. 
[Rule 11(5)(d)] requires that before a 
trial court accepts a guilty plea, it must Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
find that the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he or she is entering the plea* In Gibbons, 
this Court stated that in making this 
findingf the trial court must ensure that the 
defendant understands "the elements of the 
crimes charged and the relationship of the 
law to the facts." Id. at 1312. In 
addition, [rule 11(5)(e)] requires that 
before the trial court accepts a guilty plea, 
it must find that the defendant knows of the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences. The record clearly shows that at 
the time the guilty pleas were accepted, 
Judge Burns did not make the findings 
required by [rule 11(5) ], i.e., that Jolivet 
understood the elements of each crime charged 
and how these elements related to the facts 
and that Jolivet knew the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. 
However, this Court has held, "[T]he absence 
of a finding under [rule 11] is not critical 
so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving." State v. Miller, 718 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 
709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. 
Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
784 P.2d at 1149-50 (footnotes omitted). In State v. Copeland, 
the Court, without citing Gibbons, said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding \ 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 470, 89 S.Ct. at 1173 
(emphasis in the original). We think the 
most effective way to do this is to have the 
defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions i 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this i 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. We hold that the record Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
demonstrates that defendant admitted acts 
sufficient to justify his conviction of the 
offense to which he pleaded guilty. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Although both Jolivet and Copeland involved pre-Gibbons 
guilty pleas, this Court did not note or attach any significance 
to that fact in either opinion, and, in factf directly applied 
Gibbons in Jolivet in concluding that although the trial court 
did not strictly comply with rule 11, the record as a whole 
demonstrated that Jolivet entered his guilty pleas knowingly and 
voluntarily. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149-51. This seriously 
undermines the court of appeals' effort to distinguish Jolivet 
and Copeland on the basis that the record as a whole test was 
applied in those cases because they involved pre-Gibbons guilty 
pleas.4 Significantly, in State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 
1989), which involved a post-Gibbons guilty plea, this Court 
appeared to apply the record as a whole test in reversing the 
5 
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw. 
Finally, that the record as a whole test represents the 
most reasonable standard upon which to assess a post-conviction 
It is not clear what significance State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670 (Utah 1989) (per curiam), which was issued five days before 
Jolivet, has in this inquiry. Unlike Jolivet, Hickman declined 
to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons guilty plea on the ground that 
Gibbons represented a clear break from the past and would 
therefore not be applied retroactively. Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672 
n.l. Insofar as Hickman might be read to support the court of 
appeals' strict compliance test, it is inconsistent with Jolivet 
and should not be followed. 
The court of appeals obviously disagrees with this reading of 
Smith, having cited it in support of its decision in , and 
stating directly in State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 38 
n.6 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1990), that Smith applied the 
"strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons." 
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attack on the voluntariness of a guilty plea is made clear in the 
following passage from State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986): 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position is shortsighted, for to follow 
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong. If we were to hold any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendant's, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their 
convictions for purely tactical reasons, 
either by direct appeal or by seeking habeas 
corpus long after the fact. We have refused 
to overturn convictions upon such challenges 
in the past, e.g.f State v. Knowles, Utah, 
709 P.2d 311 (1985); State v. Morris, Utah, 
709 P.2d 310 (1985), [sic] and we find no 
reason to encourage such attacks in the 
future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical, if not 
impossible. Almost certainly, the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more that technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote omitted) . In so ruling, this 
Most jurisdictions apply a record as a whole test rather than 
the strict compliance rule adopted by the court of appeals. See, 
e.g., United States v. Barryf 895 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(district court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 does 
not warrant reversal where defendant's knowledge of rights waived 
was otherwise apparent); Wood v. State, 190 Ga.App. 179, 378 
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Court adopted the harmless error rule in assessing rule 11 
errors, a rule long recognized by this Court in a variety of 
contexts. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1989) 
(harmless error standard for nonconstitutional error); State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (Utah 1989) ("with respect to 
certain constitutional errors, we must place on the State the 
burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt"). See also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
In sum, a careful reading of Gibbons and this Court's 
pre- and post-Gibbons decisions indicates that the court of 
appeals erred in holding that Gibbons replaced the record as a 
whole test with a strict compliance test. A strict compliance 
test is not required either by Gibbons or logic. 
Accordingly, this Court should grant certiorari because 
the court of appeals has rendered a decision on a question of law 
which is in conflict with decisions of this Court. Utah R. App. 
P. 46(b). Insofar as the issue of what standard applies on 
review of the voluntariness of a guilty plea is unsettled in 
light of Gibbons, certiorari should be granted because the court 
Cont. S.E.2d 520 (Ga. App. 1989) (where defendant was 
otherwise informed of rights waived, harmless error standard is 
applied to trial court's failure to comply with rule governing 
taking of pleas); People v. Bettistea, 181 Mich.App. 194, 448 
N.W.2d 781, 783 (Mich. App. 1989) ("record as a whole" 
demonstrated that plea was made knowingly and voluntarily); 
People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 459 N.E.2d 170 (N.Y. 1983) 
(voluntariness of plea determined by considering all relevant 
circumstances surrounding it, not by judge's ritualistic 
recitation of rights waived). 
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of appeals has decided an important question of law which should 
be settled by this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State's petition 
for certiorari should be granted pursuant to rule 46(b) or (d), 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _± day of December, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
Q 
^JUDITH S. H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Brian E. 
Maguire, pro se, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84010, this ? day 
of December, 1990. 
f u JNQI^GJ 
i 
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u- FILED 
w l M«ryT Noon*n 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ># Ciwk ol »• Court 
Uterh C#urt #t Appeals 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Brian Maguire, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 900045-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 16, 1990) 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from a denial of a motion to withdraw a 
no contest plea to aggravated assault, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990). 
On April 21, 1988, defendant entered a no contest plea to 
one count of aggravated assault, a third degree felony. In 
exchange for the no contest plea, the prosecution agreed to 
move for dismissal of a charge of mayhem, a second degree 
felony, and a charge of being a habitual criminal, which allows 
enhancement to a first degree felony, and to recommend that 
defendant be sentenced for a class A misdemeanor. The charges 
resulted from an incident in which defendant allegedly 
assaulted his grandmother, ripping off part of her ear and 
inflicting other injuries. 
At the hearing on defendant's change of plea to no 
contest, defendant signed a form affidavit, with handwritten 
additions, which set forth rights that would be waived by entry 
of the plea. The transcript of the hearing reflects that the 
defendant was informed by the trial court that by virtue of his 
prior not guilty plea, he was presumed innocent until he had 
been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; that the state 
had the burden of proving each element of each crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt; that defendant had a right to a 
trial by jury; that the court treated a no contest plea the 
same as a guilty plea for purposes of sentencing; and that the 
court would not be bound by the prosecution's recommendation 
concerning sentencing. 
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Although the trial court next questioned defendant about 
his understanding of the affidavit, the record reflects no 
specific discussion of the rights against compulsory 
self-incrimination or the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against him. The court asked defendant if he was 
aware of the possible sentence for a third degree felony and 
defendant responded affirmatively; however, the court did not 
advise defendant of the minimum and maximum sentences. 
Defendant contended in support of the motion to withdraw 
his plea that the trial court failed to strictly comply with 
the requirements of Rule 11(5), as required by State v. 
fiUbbjans, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). Defendant further 
contended that the facts set forth in the affidavit did not 
satisfy the statutory elements of the offense.* Defendant's 
final contention is that he was deprived of the benefit of the 
plea bargain, i.e., sentencing to a class A misdemeanor, 
because he was not advised that the conviction would result in 
a revocation of parole on two prior convictions. 
On appeal, the defendant makes the same arguments that 
were asserted in the trial court and also challenges the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the 
motion to withdraw. Our determination of the issues raised 
under Utah R. Crim. P. 11 is dispositive of the appeal, making 
it unnecessary to consider defendant's claim that the 
prosecution or the trial court was obligated to advise him of 
the effect of the plea on his parole status. We find the 
challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction to 
be wholly without merit. 
The state concedes "that the trial court did not conduct 
the complete on-the-record review with defendant of the rule 
11(e) requirements as mandated by" State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 
P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. £enie£, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 
1988); State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(per curiam); State v. Gentry. 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct, 
App. 1990) and State v. Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep, 35 (Utah 
1. Utah R. Crim* P. ll(5)(d) requires that the trial court 
find "the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he is entering the plea." Defendant does not 
specifically address Rule 11 in his argument that the elements 
of the offense were not established. 
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Ct. App. 1990).2 The State urges this court to reverse its 
prior holdings that a trial court must strictly comply with 
Rule 11 in accepting a guilty plea, which we decline to do. 
State v. Pharris is dispositive of the issues raised in this 
case. We conclude that the trial court did not review with the 
defendant on the record each of the requirements of Rule 11 and 
that the motion to withdraw should have been granted. 
We find that the trial court failed to strictly comply 
with Rule 11 and Gibbons, and we vacate defendant's conviction 
and remand to the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw 
his no contest plea. 
ALL CONCUR: 
Norma 
Russell W. Bench, Judge* 
?**z~ 
Gregory ^ T Orme, Judge 
2. The State contends that the Court of Appeals decisions 
cited above incorrectly interpret State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987) as requiring strict compliance with Rule 11 
requirements. Thus, the State continues to make this argument 
in order to preserve the issue for possible certiorari review. 
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